The government of Iraq, which reneged on the March 11 Agreement and stalled negotiations with the leadership of the Aylul Revolution, resumed the war with the intention of ending the revolution in a short time, given that during the four years of ceasefire and negotiations, it had armed itself in a way by strengthening its relations with the superpower state of the former Soviet Union to provide weapons, ammunition, and military advisors, etc., and was now capable of achieving its goal, which was to crush the Kurdish revolution.
Mount Korak is also one of the important and strategic mountains in the region; if any military force were to gain control over the entire mountain, the city of Rawandiz, the Diana Plain, and its surroundings, which are referred to as the Soran Basin, would be at risk, and it would be difficult for the other force to hold its ground in that area. Although the Iraqi army had previously withdrawn its military forces from the Rawandiz garrison and the village of Balakian to the Spilik area west of the town of Khalifan, it had by no means vacated the peak of Mount Korak.
With the resumption of the war in 1974, the Peshmerga forces launched several campaigns and attacks on it but could not overcome it; rather, the Iraqi army, due to advanced weaponry, large force, and the difficulty of the terrain, was able to defend it.
The geographical location of Mount Korak is such that it separates Gali Ali Beg from Mount Goraz. In an attack on Goraz in April 1974, the Peshmerga were able to seize the Iraqi army's outposts. Although the Iraqi army tried several times to recapture it and from there extend its advances to the Diana Plain and the Balakayati region, it was not successful.
In Gali Ali Beg, the Iraqi army also wanted to attack and extend its advances along the Hamilton Road, but the Peshmerga, to protect that flank of the battle and thwart the Iraqi army's attack plan, mined the roads and prepared to blow up the bridges so that the Iraqi army's tanks and armored vehicles could not cross.
With the start of the attack, the Peshmerga blew up the bridges, which are several bridges located on that road. When the soldiers were busy repairing the bridges and the army's engineering and mine/explosives department began clearing mines and opening the road, the revolution's artillery heavily shelled them, and from the high points of Mount Balakian and Bapashtian, they did not allow them to carry out their work with long-range DShK weapons. Their attack failed, so the army's military commanders, with the help of Russian advisors, thought of another way to carry out the attack.
Simultaneously with the attacks on Goraz and Gali Ali Beg, in April, at the foot of Korak above the Bekhal waterfall and the top of the mountain, the Iraqi army attacked the Peshmerga's positions with the support of warplanes, heavy weapons, and countless soldiers. At first, they were able to seize some places such as Darqasp and Gor Nok, which resulted in casualties on both sides, but the Peshmerga, in order to retake their positions and drive the Iraqi army out of those places, carried out a counter-attack on April 19, 1974, and were able to achieve victory and return to their positions.
On August 8, 1974, the Iraqi army, with a well-organized war plan under the command of Brigadier General Ismail Taya Nu'aimi, once again launched a widespread attack on both Mount Korak and Goraz in order to break the Peshmerga's positions and recapture Rawandiz and the Diana Plain. Clearly, due to the difficulty of the terrain, it could not rely on tanks and armored vehicles. The Peshmerga forces resisted them very strongly and repelled the attack; as a result, the Iraqi army was blocked and suffered a very major defeat and was forced back. They even left 400 corpses of their dead on the battlefield. On the side of the Peshmerga forces, six Peshmerga were martyred in this battle. What is worth mentioning is that the revolution's artillery, under the command of Hali Dolamari, played an important role in defeating this attack by the Iraqi army.
Clearly, the Iraqi army was not satisfied with this major defeat; rather, it changed its war strategy. It thought of a plan that was far from the imagination and thoughts of the Peshmerga. Under the command of Lieutenant Colonel Staff Abdulwahab, in the darkness of the night, it began to build a road from the top of Mount Korak downwards, meaning between Korak and Bekhal, using heavy bulldozers to move boulders and open a road for tanks and armored combat vehicles.
On the morning of August 8, 1974, the Iraqi army's attack, which consisted of the 5th Mountain Infantry Force of the 4th Brigade and the 2nd Tank Battalion of the 8th Armored Force, which consisted of Soviet (T55) tanks and American (M113) armored vehicles, descended from the top of the mountain until they reached the Bekhal road.
The situation then turned in favor of the Iraqi army, and the Peshmerga abandoned those positions and retreated. The Iraqi army's tanks entered the city of Rawandiz and, from the back side of Mount Bapashtian, climbed over the mountain in the direction of the DShK that had been placed on the lower part of the mountain, which overlooked Gali Ali Beg to support the Peshmerga forces in Mount Goraz, Gali Ali Beg, and the foot of Korak. Especially in Gali Ali Beg, the Iraqi army soldiers could not show their heads in Kani Maran inside the valley because of that DShK, unaware of the situation the Peshmerga forces were facing and that the Iraqi army tank had reached them; there were three Peshmerga there, and all of them were taken prisoner.
The Iraqi Army achieved a major victory in this attack, for which it had been intensifying its efforts for five months in order to reach Rawanduz and Diana again. The Peshmerga forces retreated on Sari Goraz to behind Diana, and from the side of Bekhal, they left the foothills of Mount Korak and withdrew to Bena Kawal and Barziwa. Accordingly, they established a defensive line in the Akoyan Valley, Handren, Zozk, and the Omar Agha gorge.
Sources:1- Interview with Qadir Hassan Sitkani, a Peshmerga of the September Revolution, 31/12/2022.
2- Ghazi Adil Gardi, A Peshmerga in the service of Barzani... Haji Birokhi, Volume One, Second Edition, 2020, pp. 446-448.
3- Sangar Ibrahim Khoshnaw, Military Events of the September Revolution 1970-1975, First Edition, Erbil, 2022, pp. 201-202.
4- Archive of the Kurdistan Democratic Party Encyclopedia Board.
5- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part Two, First Edition, Erbil 2004, p. 157.
7- Interview with Muhammad Aziz Omar, a Peshmerga of the September Revolution, 18/1/2023.