After the Iraqi government reneged on the March 11, 1970 agreement and resumed the war in August 1974, the Iraqi Army was able, through a successful military plan on Mount Korak, to move its tanks down to the Bekhal road with a large force armed with advanced heavy and light weapons to change the strategy of the war (Khoshnaw, 2022, 202). The Peshmerga was forced to leave Mount Goraz and withdraw behind Diana, and from the side of Rawanduz, they left the foothills of Mount Korak and withdrew to Bnakawal and Barziwa. A defensive line was established in the Akoyan Valley, Mount Handren, Mount Zozik, and the Omar Agha Pass.
The Iraqi Army, which had suffered such a major defeat in the attack on the Omar Agha Pass on September 3, 1974, and had suffered heavy human and material losses, was forced to retreat to the village of Badian. Therefore, it was looking for another way to cover up its defeat and occupy another strategic location so that it could establish control over the entire area. For this, according to the information that had reached their military commanders that there were not many Peshmerga forces on Mount Zozik, they saw this as an opportunity, and they allocated a battalion from the (8th) Brigade. On September 20, 1974, they were able to occupy several Peshmerga force positions on Mount Zozik.
However, the Peshmerga forces did not stand idly by in the face of the Iraqi Army's attacks; rather, they responded very strongly and launched a counterattack on the locations that the Iraqi Army had captured. With the help of the revolution's artillery, they were able to recapture Mount Zozik.
In an interview, one of the Peshmerga who participated in that battle of Mount Zozik, named Gorgis Yalda Tarkhan, recounts and says: (Early one morning, we saw that the mercenaries (Jash) and Iraqi Army soldiers had approached us, having attacked the Peshmerga positions from Diana. They opened fire on us, and several of our Peshmerga were wounded. There was a guard post above us that was a very important and strategic point that they had captured. Our leader, named (Haji Berokhi), who was the commander of that war front, decided to carry out a counterattack and recapture the point that had fallen into the hands of the Iraqi Army as soon as possible. After the Peshmerga, supported by a Dushka heavy weapon from the support forces, carried out our counterattack and stormed the occupied position, after a fierce battle, we were able to recapture the place and achieve victory. The enemy could not withstand the Peshmerga's assault and retreated to their bases in Diana. In this battle, our sacrifice was one Martyr and one wounded, but the enemy suffered a major defeat and heavy losses. The bodies of three soldiers and an officer fell into the hands of the Peshmerga. If it were not for the presence of rocky areas, crevices, and large boulders where they hid for cover, they would have suffered much greater losses).
However, just a week later, on September 27-28, 1974, an Iraqi Army force consisting of the (5th) Infantry Brigade and a battalion of the (29th) Special Forces (Qawat Khasa), supported by a tank battalion, attacked Mount Zozik. Clearly, the Peshmerga forces, in a strong defense according to an organized and proper military plan, confronted them with all types of weapons they had at their disposal and repelled the Iraqi Army's attack. They were able to inflict heavy losses on them and eliminate most of the officers and soldiers of this Iraqi Army battalion, one of the killed being a platoon commander.
The importance of occupying Mount Zozik for the Iraqi Army was such a strategic matter that the military commanders were insistent on occupying it. Therefore, they put great pressure on the military units with infantry, tanks, armored vehicles, artillery, and air power to attack the mountain again. For this, they launched another larger and more intense attack, but this time they were able to capture it on September 30, 1974. However, the Peshmerga forces once again prepared themselves for a confrontation and counterattack. Under the leadership and supervision of Masoud Barzani, they drew up a plan and map for a counterattack. As a result of that attack, the Peshmerga forces achieved a great victory and inflicted heavy losses on the Iraqi Army, which consisted of destroying (5) tanks and the killing of (500) soldiers whose bodies were left on the battlefield.
Qadir Hassan Sitkani, a Peshmerga of the September Revolution, spoke to us about the Zozik battle and said: (The geographical layout of the top of Mount Zozik consists of two heights, one of them is called Kupi Stira and the other is Kupi Bira. They are about (1-2 km) apart from each other, and between them is a flat land without trees or rocky areas. For a while, the Peshmerga forces were on Kupi Stira, and the Iraqi Army was on Kupi Bira; they had taken positions against each other. To expel the Iraqi forces from Kupi Bira, a Peshmerga force carried out an assault one day, and in broad daylight, they stormed the height of Kupi Bira, but they could not achieve victory in recapturing the height due to the strength of the Iraqi Army's defense, which fought a fierce battle and inflicted heavy losses on the Peshmerga forces, which consisted of the martyrdom of (17) Peshmerga and a number of wounded).
It is clear that the strategy of the Iraqi Army to capture Zozik Mountain was such that after all the defeats and losses it had suffered, they were still not prepared to give it up. This was why on October 3, 1974, they attacked the mountain again and were able to fully capture it. As a result of the disparity in weapons, ammunition, and force, the Peshmerga decided to retreat and established another line of defense at Beshe Pass, Hassan Beg Mountain, and Sari Bardi so as not to allow the enemy army to advance any further and get closer to the revolution's leadership.
Although the country of Iran supported the revolution with an artillery battalion of 130mm caliber and two Rapier anti-aircraft missile batteries that arrived at the battlefronts in October 1974, they did not create any positive or encouraging impact on the battlefronts. They did not play an effective role in stopping the advances of the Iraqi Army or changing the balance of power; rather, on the contrary, it resulted in a kind of lethargy, negligence, and turning away from the battlefronts by the Peshmerga. They placed all their hope on this artillery, believing that from now on, the shelling from this Iranian battalion would become a strong barrier against the aggression, advancement, and step-by-step occupation of the land of Kurdistan, but unfortunately, it did not turn out that way, because their shelling was not very accurate, did not hit their targets, and had no such impact that would have been of any significant benefit when they were needed in times of crisis as was expected.
It is clear that the arrival of the winter season was not a favorable condition for the Iraqi Army to be able to advance further and face the Peshmerga force. The Peshmerga force was also always looking for an opportunity and a suitable chance to strike a major blow against it. This was why in December 1974, it launched several attacks on the Iraqi Army, and in January 1975, it raided its outposts and was able to take back half of Zozik Mountain from its control.
Sources:1- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part Two, First Edition, Erbil 2004, p. 158
2- Sangar Ibrahim Khoshnaw, Military Events of the September Revolution 1970-1975, First Edition, Erbil, 2022, p. 220.
3- Kurdistan Democratic Party Encyclopedia Archive, interview with Gorgis Yalda Tarkhan, a Peshmerga of the September Revolution.
4- Interview with Qadir Hassan Sitkani, a Peshmerga of the September Revolution, Soran, December 31, 2022.
5- Ibrahim Jalal, Southern Kurdistan and the September Revolution, Foundation and Collapse, 1961-1975. Fourth Edition, 2021.