According to the indication of Masoud Barzani in the book Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, the revolutionary leadership had been thinking for some time about striking the oil facilities, and this was for some clear and obvious reasons, including that many parties benefited from the oil wealth, but the Kurd was deprived of it. The revenue from this oil was allocated for purchasing weapons and destructive bombs, which were then tested on the Kurds. Also, the revolution of Kurdistan needed other new activities to prove its strength to the new regime of Iraq, which were the Baathists who took power for the second time through a coup from July 17 to 30, 1968. The goal was to do something effective against the government and cause it major damage, and it was also a clear message to the Baathists that the Kurd can reach the government's largest economic source.
It is clear that previously the Peshmerga had attacked oil transport pipelines more than once, but neither the government nor the oil company were that bothered by it. However, after the revolutionary leadership lost hope of reaching an understanding with Iraq regarding negotiations and resolving the Kurdish issue, it decided to carry out such an activity and began preparing and implementing the attack plan. Thus, on the evening of March 1, 1969, a special force affiliated with the revolutionary leadership was able to attack the Kirkuk Oil Company, cause it great damage, and spread the voice of Kurdish protest to the world.
The task of leading this operation was Sami Abdulrahman entrusted, along with a group of experienced commanders who were his assistants, such as Fakhir Mergasori, Faris Bawa, Hamasur Hussein, Ezaddin Qara Muhammad, Arif Darwish, and Qadir Jabbari. After careful study, a complete plan was drawn up. It turned out that the main target must be the concentration plant, where oil is collected from all oil wells after passing through gas separation stations that work continuously, then it goes to the storage facilities from which oil is exported.
In an interview, Sami Abdulrahman discusses this and says: To obtain and collect information, they benefited from those Kurds who worked at the oil company. After a careful study, they found out that the oil, after being separated from the gas at the separation stations, all goes to a storage facility they call the concentration plant (ma'mal tarkiz) in the north of the city of Kirkuk. All the oil comes from those 10 to 12 gas stations to the aforementioned plant and is stored, then it is pushed to K-1, and from there it is sent by pipeline towards Syria to the Mediterranean Sea. In his indication, he believes that this oil collection storage was the most effective place to receive a fatal blow.
Preparations for this activity took two months. Several times, experts and specialists in this type of activity went to inspect the area to find a suitable place to carry out this activity successfully. The plan for the activity was drawn up with the utmost secrecy, and the information did not leak in any way to the government's intelligence agencies. After holding several meetings with the participation of Idris Barzani, the first military official of the revolution, a group of youth from the Halgurd force were put into a special course for training on the weapons allocated for that task, such as 120mm and 106mm artillery. Specifically, they relied on the 106mm artillery because it is incendiary and destructive. Before starting the activity, a field reconnaissance was carried out. Sami Abdulrahman and Fakhir Mergasori set off from Galala. In Erbil, Faris Bawa, commander of the Erbil Plain Force, and Hamasur Hussein, commander of the Shwan Battalion near the oil facilities, joined them, and then they identified the place where the artillery would be installed.
Preparations for collecting information ended at the end of January 1969, and February 15 was the final stage of training, which also ended. According to the indication of Qadir Jabbari in an interview, he says we set off from Choman, which was a very cold winter and a lot of snow had fallen. On the way from Khanaqa to Warti, we faced great difficulties in transporting the artillery and artillery shells until we reached Zini Asterekan, but what was gratifying was that the people of Warti helped them a lot. Because the load of more than 100 mules of artillery and various ammunition was transported through the mountainous road to the Erbil plain.
After completing the preparations for starting, on February 25, 1969, to deceive the government, the revolution's Parastin agency, in its own special way, began spreading some news that the Peshmerga intended to carry out a broad campaign of guerrilla activity in the Erbil plain. The purpose of this was to attract the government's attention to the Erbil plain and move the largest force to that battle front and weaken the other fronts in terms of force. The result of that deceptive propaganda campaign was the movement of a military battalion in Ridar, which was a main source of anxiety for the Peshmerga because it was a dangerous obstacle to the success of the activity. Because of that, the battalion was moved to the Erbil plain, and the way became easier for the Peshmerga to carry it out.
On the night of March 1 to 2, 1969, the Peshmerga forces reached the places that had been identified for them in the plan. According to the plan that had been drawn up, the work was proceeding well. At 9 o'clock at night, the artillery began striking the company's facilities, and they shelled them for about two hours. They set fire to the concentration storage, and the large flames of fire covered the sky of the area. At 11 o'clock that same night, a telegram from Sami Abdulrahman reached the leadership that they had successfully carried out their work. The Peshmerga force had made all its preparations in case of a counter-attack by the government. About 800 Peshmerga were on alert to protect the artillery and confront the army's attack, covering the fronts of Yarweil, Eastap Line, the arsenal behind Rahimawa, Daraman, and the road to Taqtaq and Altun Kupri.
Half an hour after the burning of the oil company in both the Istap Line and Rahimawa axes, the military launched an attack on the Peshmerga. A force of 300 Peshmerga with heavy weapons such as artillery, DShK, RPGs, and machine guns resisted them. They attacked twice to reach the artillery but were defeated. From 10:00 PM to 1:30 AM, the Peshmerga continued to confront the army's attack and inflicted heavy losses on them. Then, the Peshmerga force withdrew, and aircraft bombed the Shwan and Jabari areas, continuing to do so the following day. It is worth noting that after carrying out this major activity in the city of Kirkuk, the Peshmerga returned without losses and sent a victory telegram to Barzani, the leader of the revolution. Barzani also sent them a telegram of appreciation, expressing his respect and gratitude.
One year later, the magazine (Ahl al-Naft), which the oil company published, discussed the repair of the places that had been destroyed. It took eleven months to repair them because they had suffered such a massive blow. It is worth noting that this strike on the oil company in Baba Gurgur, in addition to being a great victory for the revolution, was also an open message to the Ba'ath government that the revolutionary forces had the capability to reach deep into Iraqi regions and strike their interests. At the same time, it had a great resonance internally and in international media. The prolongation of the war between Kurdistan and the Iraqi government had plunged the latter into a major financial crisis and an increase in debts, because the daily battles cost several million dinars, in addition to heavy casualties. These were all important factors that led the government to come to the negotiating table with the revolution's leadership. Its reactions consisted only of fortifying the surroundings of the company's facilities with tanks and infantry forces for protection.
Sources:1- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part One, Aylul Revolution 1961-1975, Ministry of Culture Press, 1st ed., Erbil, 2004.
2- Karwan Jawhar Muhammad, Idris Barzani 1944-1987 Life and Political and Military Role in the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Hevi Press, Erbil, 2019.
3- Shawkat Mullah Ismail Hassan, Days in the History of the Aylul Revolution, 1st ed., Erbil, 2007.
4- Ari Karim, Some Living Pages of the Aylul Revolution, Khabat Press, Duhok, 1999.
5- Ibrahim Jalal, Southern Kurdistan and the Aylul Revolution: Building and Collapse 1961-1975, 4th ed., 2021.
6- Hawkar Karim Hama Sharif, Aylul Revolution, Salahaddin University Press, 1st ed., Erbil, 2012.