In fact, the Party organizations within the military units of Zakho were constantly relaying news and military movements in the area to the official of the Zakho District Committee of the Party, Mullah Salih Haji Balqusi, and the latter, for his part, would relay the information to the area commander, Issa Siwar. Since March 1962, the Peshmerga had taken control of a number of government outposts, and in Gali Zakho and the Silivane (Asihi) sub-district, they had fortified themselves in the village of Turkeza and Gali Qalma. Issa Siwar received an urgent letter from the Zakho District Committee stating that a military battalion from Sheikhan, commanded by Colonel Majid Sab' al-Abusi, was moving for the purpose of rotating with the Batifa battalion. The Batifa battalion set off from a valley towards the Faida military base on the morning of April 1, 1962, and at 8:00, the head of the convoy reached Gali Zakho. It is worth noting that this information had previously been provided through Khurshid Salim Sher, who was a member of the Party organizations in the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Brigade, and he, in turn, relayed the news of the battalion's transfer to Mullah Ali Rashad Hajani, so that he could inform the Peshmerga commander, Issa Siwar.
When the news arrived, Issa Siwar held a meeting in the village of Hassan Ava with several Peshmerga squad leaders. The purpose of that meeting was to set a plan to strike the 2nd Battalion of the 3rd Brigade of the Iraqi Army. After discussing the plan, the Peshmerga forces in Gali Zakho were divided into several groups as follows: The first group, which consisted of Issa Siwar and some of his guards and several Peshmerga from Upper Barwari, led by Derbaz Heruri, were deployed below Gali Zakho near the village of Hassan Ava. The second group was in the lower part of the valley towards the west, consisting of the squads of Hashim Mirozi, Yasin Rashe Mirozi, Ahmed Mahu Sharanshi, Ali Rasho, Farhan Ali, and Sergeant Darwish. In the middle of the valley, the third group, towards the east up to the Serije Buke base, consisted of squad leader Ali Halo, Salman Khurshid, Saeed Halo, Saeed Khalil, and several other Peshmerga. The fourth group, which consisted of Sheikh Mustafa Haji Mahmoud, Muhammad Khalid, Numan Muhammad, Sha'ban Saeed, and Jangir Sivo, had the task of engaging the Kalfirine military post. As for the fifth group, which consisted of Suleiman Lachi Mizuri Bala, Sergeant Suleiman Doski, Ali Ali Saifaddin, Sheikh Sadiq Abdullah, Amin Ozmani, and several other Peshmerga, they had taken the eastern side of Gali Zakho up to the middle. The last group was a few Peshmerga led by squad leader Yasin Muhi Dizwi and the Peshmerga of Abdulrahman Muhammad Abdal; they were assigned to strike and engage the Kukhen-Turkeza military post. In that same meeting, the battle plan was drawn up in such a way that everyone would adhere to the instructions. The plan was for the first shot to be fired by Ali Halo's squad, and it was also emphasized that the Peshmerga should protect themselves from the enemy, especially from the aircraft. What was insisted upon most was that under no circumstances should the two vehicles at the front of the convoy escape, because the first belonged to the battalion commander and the second to the radio, and if they reached Faida in Duhok, reinforcements would come to their aid.
After that preparation and readiness, the confrontation plan was designed in the form of an ambush. The Peshmerga, in a very secret manner and with a tight military plan, covered themselves with tree leaves along the valley. The first thing the Peshmerga did was to cut the telephone lines between Zakho and Mosul. On the morning of April 1, 1962, the battalion convoy reached the gorge, which consisted of 35 vehicles, five tanks, five jeeps belonging to the officers, along with two pickups for the battalion commander's guards and radio and communication equipment. When they reached the end of the gorge, the military convoy was met with gunfire from both sides by the Peshmerga. The result of the clash was the killing and wounding of a number of officers and soldiers, including the battalion commander, Colonel Muhammad Yahya, who was wounded, and his assistant, Lieutenant Colonel Nasim Turkomani, who was killed. Also, six officers and 173 soldiers and non-commissioned officers were taken prisoner by the Peshmerga, and 53 officers and soldiers were wounded. Along with that, the Peshmerga were able to seize all the weapons, ammunition, military vehicles, and equipment of the battalion, which were mentioned above. In return, the Peshmerga's casualties were the martyrdom of Yasin Mirozi, Sabri Abdi, and Qadir Ismail Hassan. At the same time, several Peshmerga were wounded, including Muhammad Yusuf Gravi, Ismail Hajar, Faizi Osman, Suleiman Asu, and many others.
That battle had a great impact among military, political, and civilian circles. Even the Chief of Staff of the Iraqi Army, Lieutenant General Ahmed Salih al-Abdi, found it difficult to present the telegram to Abd al-Karim Qasim; he had delayed the telegram of the defeat for more than 10 minutes. In Baghdad, this rumor had spread at that time, as the Chief of Staff had asked an officer to place the telegram on the President's desk. This caused this disgraceful defeat to resonate widely throughout Iraq, to the point that Iraqi citizens began to mock the propaganda of Abd al-Karim Qasim, who had previously announced that he had put an end to the gangs and outlaws! At the same time, the army realized that the war and killing in Kurdistan had entered a new phase and that destroying the Kurdish movement was not easy. Even the Iraqi political forces and parties realized that the continuation of the war in Kurdistan would cause more damage to Iraq and that the problems would continue, except for the Ba'ath Party and the Arab nationalists, whose position remained unchanged regarding the Kurdish cause. They claimed that the Kurdish rebellion continued because of Abd al-Karim Qasim's leniency and his failure to use violence against them, and that they could be suppressed and destroyed through intense shelling and the use of excessive force and more violence against them. That is how it turned out; the government's reaction was to send more forces and army units to Kurdistan. At the same time, a campaign of pursuit and arrest of civilians and sympathizers and supporters of the Kurdish revolution began in the town of Zakho, and they were thrown into prisons on charges of supporting the Kurdish revolution without any evidence or witnesses.
Sources:1. Abdul-Fattah Ali al-Botani, Badinan Region 1925 – 1970, Vol. 2, Salahaddin University Press, Erbil, 2017, p. 166.
2. Muhammad Salih Pendroyi (Jagar Soz), The Life and Struggle of the Martyr Commander Abdul-Rahim Jasim Barzani, no place of publication, 2020, p. 61.
3. Rozhin Chalabi Munir, Zakho 14 July 1958 – 6 March 1975, Zakho Center for Kurdish Studies, Zakho, 2018, pp. 151 – 152.
4. Shakib Aqrawi, Years of Ordeal in Kurdistan. The Most Important Political and Military Events in Kurdistan and Iraq from 1958 – 1980, Al-Thaqafa Press, Erbil, 2007, pp. 72 – 73.