What you have before you was prepared by Saeed Kaki, which is originally an interview translated ten years ago by Mr. Behrouz Rahimi, but he did not have the opportunity to publish it. In a meeting I had with him, he said I also have an article about the Barzani revolution, which is a conversation with Morteza Zarbakht, who himself was an eyewitness to the struggle of the Barzanis and lived with them. Later he said I also have the map of General Barzani's marches; I even found a teacher and he gave me the names of the villages the Barzanis passed through, I asked him about everything. I also set the map as it was, and he said, do you know that this march was known at the time as one of the important military marches and Razm Ara [1] at the time, ordered it to be taught as a military lesson in the military college. It is worth mentioning that this conversation was sent by Dr. Hevin Hiwa Ahmed Mustafa to the Kurdistan Democratic Party encyclopedia board. Kurdistan Democratic Party sent.
Cooperation with General Mulla Mustafa Barzani and meeting with Qazi Muhammad
From the beginning, Zarbakht talked about the cooperation of Mulla Mustafa Barzani and his meeting with Qazi Muhammad and said: Before we set off towards the village of Sara, Mulla Mustafa gave us some ammunition [2] and some bullets. At 8 o'clock on the night of November 21, 1325 (1947 AD), the military units were ready to leave. Our friend Tiwa said: Through Lieutenant Haqparast, they have sent a truck of meat, chickpeas, beans, bread, rice, etc., to Bukan, so that you can eat a hot meal before you arrive. From this place to Bukan is about eighteen kilometers and the weather is very cold. After three hours of marching, we arrived in Bukan with the brigade and they gave us "Ehsani", Isti [3] When we stopped near the castle, the Kurds surrounded the military unit and whispered to the soldiers: Come, let us hide you, and later we will get you out. The people of the military unit were soldiers. Our friend Tiwa also had no experience in Kurdistan, he shouted at the Kurds and ordered them to move away from the unit quickly, otherwise I will shoot you. Later, he fired his submachine gun into the air. The people moved away. In Bukan, inside the castle, a brigade was stationed, Major "Khakzadi" was the commander of those brigades. When we entered the castle, the Kurds were busy looting the warehouses. They took the boxes of ammunition, cans of canned food, and everything that was in the castle and took them outside. We could not do anything, we did not even know what it was. Later we realized that they had arrested the brigade commander, disarmed the soldiers, and released them, and now they are busy looting the warehouses. The Kurds of Bukan handed over Major "Khakzadi" - the commander of the Bukan castle brigade - to the Shah's army and executed him in a summary court in Mahabad. Then we officers came out of the castle in that chaos to return to the brigade, but to our great surprise, we saw that not a single soldier was visible, it was as if they were snow and had melted. In this turmoil, the Kurds of Bukan had coveted their weapons and disarmed them all. We returned to the castle again.
At that very moment, a truck was stopped inside the castle, it was loaded with gasoline canisters and was taking them to Mahabad. The driver of the truck knew Captain Tiwa. He said to him: Do not stop here, your lives are in danger. Captain Tiwa said: What should we do? He said: Get on this truck and we will go out. We got on and sat on the gasoline canisters and came out of the castle.
We, the inexperienced, did not know the Kurdish language, nor were we familiar with the place, nor did we know anyone. We were young and in this region, we were strangers and our fate was unknown, we had fallen into the wake of disaster. When we left "Sara", we no longer had news of General Mulla Mustafa, the only path in front of us was Bukan. The truck arrived in Mahabad early in the morning. The driver dropped us off by the Mahabad River and we asked about Qazi Muhammad's house. We were seven officers who went to Mahabad on November 22, 1325 (1947 AD). Ehsani, Tiwa, Arteshiar, Nicola Markarian, Ali Asghari, Tavakkoli, and I (Zarbakht). Three others, Tafreshi, Rais Dana, Dabbaghzadeh, who had cannons and General Mulla Mustafa had sheltered them and brought them to Mahabad and Naghadeh. In Mahabad, they showed us Qazi Muhammad's office and we went to him.
Ahmadi: Did all seven of you go into Qazi Muhammad's office together and see him?
Zarbakht: Yes, we greeted him; all of us with weapons and division officer uniforms and military ranks on our shoulders. Qazi Muhammad welcomed us with respect and honor, and we sat down. He asked where you came from? We said, we were in Saqqez, we received this news - Pishevari's telegram to the military units - and we came here. Qazi Muhammad said: Have you eaten? We said: We haven't even had dinner.
He sent for bread, cheese, and sweet tea for us. We started eating and talking. We said: Why did it turn out like this? He said: The night before last - November 20 - Pishevari called me and said, they have ordered us to go to Julfa. We are also going to Julfa with our wives and children. You also take your wives and children and come to "Julfa" and from there we will go to the Soviet Union. Qazi Muhammad said: I told him: "No, I will not come, I will stay here, whatever disaster befalls my nation, let it befall me too."
Qazi Muhammad asked us, 'What do you want to do now?' We said: 'We are determined to go to the Soviet Union. Because we have no other solution.' Yes, at that time it did not even cross our minds that the Soviet administrators were not flawless. We thought the Soviet Union was that promised 'paradise' that would receive us with open arms. We did not have a shred of doubt about the Soviet Union and its policy. We considered Stalin the leader of the world's toilers. In any case, Qazi Muhammad said: 'You cannot go in this Situation. These weapons of yours are your life-takers. You must also change your clothes and wear Kurdish clothes.' After this instruction, he said: 'I will also write a letter to the Kurdish tribal chiefs, perhaps it will be of use to you.' He wrote the letter, I believe with this content: 'Brothers! These are Azerbaijani officers, they have come to help us. Provide them with whatever help they need.' It is a pity I do not know what happened to that letter. Perhaps we were taken prisoner. They took the letter from us or we lost it ourselves.
Qazi Muhammad sent for Kurdish clothes to be brought for us, and we put them on. Qazi Muhammad gave us two hundred tomans each. Later, I realized that he was a human being who, in those circumstances, accepted to stay and be killed without agitation and with that character and calmness, but not to leave his nation alone. When the army's attack on Azerbaijan began, he remained in Mahabad and cooperated with the central army until the army came to Mahabad; he did not let a drop of blood come from a Kurd's nose, meaning he stayed and kept his comrade. Then they arrested him, his brother, and his cousin, and they were tried and executed by hanging.
On one side was Qazi Muhammad and on the other was Pishevari. I do not want to say in this comparison that Pishevari was a bad person, no, he was a person who believed in support. Later he realized they had abandoned him and he had no path left. That was the very thing 'Quliyev' had told him in Tabriz. When he had come to defend. Quliyev had told him: 'Be ready at Haji Chai at eight o'clock at night, you must go to Julfa!' Pishevari had said, 'Why? We have struggled, we have made promises to our nation, we must stay and defend.' 'Quliyev' at the Soviet consulate in Tabriz had told him: 'Sani giyateren sane dirget.' Meaning the person who brought you tells you that you must go. Yes, in this very way, Pishevari was 'disarmed'. With the belief he had in the Soviet Union, he had accepted to go.
Yes, it was not for nothing that at the beginning of the revolution and the anniversary of Qazi Muhammad's death in Mahabad—as it was written in the newspapers and as I remember—one hundred thousand people gathered at Qazi Muhammad's grave and paid their respects. The Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iran gained such support and importance. Yes, Qazi Muhammad had such spiritual power. After the revolution, the largest square in the city of Mahabad was named after him. I do not know if this name still remains or if they have removed it, but for a while this square was named after Qazi Muhammad, the Islamic Republic government respected it because the people had such a belief, but after the revolution we saw that the Democratic Party did not take hold in Azerbaijan. It had no supporters. People no longer had that affection and belief in the Party.
Ahmadi: Where were you going after Mahabad?
Zarbakht: We decided to go from Mahabad to Urmia. At this time, we were completely unaware of the Situation in Urmia and did not know that there was killing and slaughter there, and if we went there, they would tear us apart.
That day when we came out of Qazi Muhammad's office and reached the square of Mahabad, Mahmoud Tavakkoli said: 'Damn Stalin's mustache, what a day he has brought upon us.' We were all startled by this remark of Mahmoud Tavakkoli and we turned against him and expressed our dissatisfaction. 'What did you say?' He replied as follows: 'Stalin came and established a government, created a party, and dragged us here. They abandoned a nation just like that and in one night crossed to the other side of the Aras River.' We were startled again. Our belief was still in its place and untouched. We said, 'For now, it is in our interest.'
Ahmadi: This criticism showed that Mahmoud Tavakkoli no longer had his previous belief, or at least he did not have the belief he had in the past.
Zarbakht: Mahmoud did not have the belief, but he did not express it; when he saw that we were still as believing as in the past; he no longer stood against us. I do not remember, it was in exile or in an Iraqi prison, he told us the story of Kambakhsh.
Ahmadi: How was the group of officers Known as the 53 people exposed?
Zarbakht: Yes, he said: 'Kambakhsh betrayed the 53 people and exposed them and they fell into the police's trap.' We did not believe it. But Tavakkoli was a special person, he understood very quickly.
Ahmadi: Tavakkoli was someone who in 1339 (1961 AD) published a five-hundred-page analytical book on the ideology of the Tudeh Party without the author's name outside the Country. It was a study at the level of the scientific political intellectuals of Iran at that time.
Zarbakht: Later we will talk about Tavakkoli and his beliefs and his trial in court.
Yes, we set off from Mahabad towards Urmia, we arrived at noon, we went to a teahouse, I do not remember the name of the place, we had lunch there. Several Kurdish horsemen came and said, come let us take you to our tribal leader, Sayyid Taha. He will look after you until the situation is resolved. We were afraid they would take us and disarm us. They knew we were not from here. At this moment, a lorry came from the direction of Urmia and stopped in front of the teahouse. Several Barzani gunmen were sitting in the lorry. One of them got off, he was an acquaintance of Artashiar, his name was Kak Salih. He was the leader of that group of gunmen. He greeted us and said: Where are you going? Artashiar said: We are going to Urmia. He said, a flood of blood has risen there. In Urmia, Azad Watan, the head of their division, has been torn to pieces. Do not go on this road, it is very dangerous. They will catch you and kill you on this road. We said, then what should we do? He said: Go back to Naghadeh. Naghadeh is a safe place now. The government of Naghadeh is in our hands. Go to Naghadeh now, until we see what happens. We accepted, as we had no other way. In fact, the events had made us like a football. We had lost the ability to make decisions, we had no will at that time. We had fallen into a strange place and did not know what to do. We got into that lorry and went to Naghadeh. That night we stayed in a teahouse in Naghadeh. There, the government was in the hands of the Barzanis. We asked for tea. We were tired and exhausted, I and Ezzat Ali Asghari were more distressed than everyone else. From Bukan to Mahabad, we had been sitting on gasoline tins, the gasoline tins were leaking and had completely wounded our buttocks. These wounds hurt us while marching and we could not walk well.
It was eight-thirty at night, we heard a crier announcing throughout the city: "Order, the order is of Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq Barzani. The government is a military government. From nine o'clock at night onwards, traffic is prohibited." Of course, he was announcing in the Kurdish language. Upon hearing the voice of the crier, which was in place of today's loudspeaker, we felt secure and due to extreme fatigue, we fell asleep on the platform of the teahouse.
The captivity of the Qarapapakhs
Ahmadi: Were there only the Barzani tribe in this region?
Zarbakht: No, there was another tribe there, they were Turks, in the time of the Afshars, or the Safavids, or another period, they had been moved to this region, called the Qarapapakh tribe. A tribe of Turkic origin in the middle of Kurdistan.
With this view that this region is very safe and is in the hands of the Barzanis, we slept peacefully and did not set a guard.
It was midnight, we were startled by the sound of rifle hammers and the command "Get up!". We saw several Kurds. Of course, later we found out that these were not Kurds and only had Kurdish headscarves on. The gunmen pointed at us and with the command of raise your hands, do not move from your place! One of them came forward and took our pistols and said: Follow us! A good amount of snow was falling, they made us walk in a line and as captives, they took us to the Naghadeh mosque. The Qarapapakh gunmen were our guards and told us: You are prisoners. Tomorrow it will be seen what they will do to you. We covered ourselves with the rug inside the mosque and slept.
Ahmadi: Did that letter of Qazi Muhammad that he had written to the tribal leaders, which introduced you as his friends, come in handy here?
Zarbakht: These were the Qarapapakh tribe, they were not Kurds. They had come to tie us up and hand us back to the government. One of them had pinned the medal of November 21 to his chest.
Ahmadi: Did they not help the government of Qazi Muhammad during the one year of Qazi Muhammad's government in Kurdistan?
Zarbakht: During that one year, they had cooperated with the government of Qazi Muhammad and the Democratic Party of Kurdistan, but when the tide turned, they had leaned on the central government. The leader of the Qarapapakh tribe, Colonel "Taqi Burchalu", had the rank of Colonel in the Kurdistan government during that one year.
Yes, the next day, the Qarapapakh gunmen of Naghadeh lined us up one by one and took us through the alleys to the house of the head of the Naghadeh region. The head of the region was Amir Falahi Qarapapakh, who had now gotten a fat piece to give as atonement for that one year of cooperation with the Kurdistan government, and that was by handing us over to the royal army in order to receive a medal for it. Most of the tribal leaders of Kurdistan were like this, they would winnow wherever the wind blew from. When we reached the house of the head of the region, they searched us in the hallway of the head of the region's house and took whatever money, watches, and pens we had and said: Stay here until the head of the region finishes his hookah and then he will send you to a safe place! On the way, when they were bringing us from the mosque to the house of the head of the region, we saw an Assyrian youth named Mikhail who knew our friends. He asked, where are they taking you? We said: Last night when we were sleeping in front of the teahouse, they tied us up, and now they are taking us to the head of the region.
That Assyrian youth left and quickly gave the news of our capture to Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq, the brother of Mullah Mustafa. At this moment, when they had kept us in a narrow and dark room at the house of the head of the region, Ali Muhammad Sadiq, the son of Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq, came into the room with two gunmen and went upstairs to the head of the region.
Suddenly the scene changed and they took us to the guest room. Ali Muhammad Sadiq asked the head of the region, why have you kept these people? The head of the region started stammering and said: We wanted to protect them so that they would not be assaulted. We said what protection? They took everything we had. They disarmed us and we confronted them. They gave us back our pistols, money, and belongings. The news of our capture by that Assyrian youth was the cause of our rescue. This was the third time that the Barzanis, in that situation and circumstances that had overshadowed the region, had saved the lives of us inexperienced officers in this strange country where we did not know the language of the people.
At the district official's house, I came with Ali Muhammad Sadiq to see his father. Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq, Mullah Mustafa's brother, was the commander of the Naghadeh unit. We stayed there. For lunch, they sent us to the mayor's house, where they had set up chairs. We sat under the chairs and ate our lunch there. We stayed there for two or three nights until Tafrashian, Rais Dana, and Dabaghzadeh, with their cannons and units that were with General Mullah Mustafa, reached Naghadeh.
Ahmadi: Why did it take them so long?
Zarbakht: They had set out from Saqqez on Mullah Mustafa's orders. Halfway there, a lot of snow had fallen, and their cannons were stuck in the snow and mud. It took a long time until they were able to bring the cannons from that area to here by mule. That was the reason for their late arrival. Tafrashian was the officer in charge of those cannons; he was a disciplined commander. He had convinced the soldiers of the units to come with them to Mahabad and Naghadeh, and from there, to cross over from military service and return to their families. They were soldiers. In Naghadeh, Tafrashian gave them some money for the road and sent them off, and he also wrote them papers stating that they had completed their military service.
Ahmadi: Were they soldiers of the Azerbaijan Democratic Division?
Zarbakht: Yes, those soldiers who had come to the division from Tabriz for military service were of two types: one was the Fedayeen who had come of their own volition, and the others were within the framework of military law. The head of the military department there, Colonel 'Shafai', was one of the officers of the Khorasan uprising.
General Mullah Mustafa's trip to Tehran
On the evening of the day that Mullah Mustafa, Tafrashian, and their units had gone to Naghadeh, Colonel Ghaffari, representing Brigadier Homayouni, the commander of the regional army, came to Naghadeh to talk with General Mullah Mustafa and requested that he come to Tehran for negotiations with government officials. General Mullah Mustafa, along with Colonel Mirhaj and Colonel Izzat Abdulaziz, two Kurdish officers from Iraq, met with Colonel Ghaffari.
Ahmadi: Was Mirhaj a member of the Iraqi Communist Party?
Zarbakht: Yes, Mirhaj was a member of the Iraqi Communist Party (Hiwa of Kurdistan). These men were, in fact, Mullah Mustafa's advisors who had defected from the Iraq army to support General Mullah Mustafa.
Ahmadi: In fact, the central government's goal in this invitation was to buy time. It seems they did not have enough readiness at that stage to confront the Barzanis. Therefore, they wanted to pass the time to prepare themselves to suppress them. What is your opinion?
Zarbakht: That is correct. The army's purpose in this invitation was an opportunity to gather forces and prepare for the final suppression of the Barzanis. Of course, the Barzanis also understood this intention. They were also thinking of buying time because their wives and children were holding them back, and they wanted to get through the winter somehow. After obtaining the consent of his older brother, Sheikh Ahmed, who was the head and spiritual leader of the tribe, General Mullah Mustafa, accompanied by Colonel Mirhaj Akrayi and Colonel Izzat Abdulaziz, went with Colonel Ghaffari to Tehran to see the Shah and negotiate with Prime Minister Ahmad Qavam (Qavam os-Saltaneh) and Razmara, the Chief of the Army.
March towards Oshnavieh
During this time, Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq, who was always kind to us, said: Naghadeh is not a safe place for you, so it is in your best interest to go to Oshnavieh, which is under our control.
It was the end of November 1947 (1325), and we, the 10 exiled officers: Tafrashian, Ehsani, Arteshiar, Tivai, Rais Dana, Zarbakht, Ali Asghari, Tavakkoli, Markazian, and Dabaghzadeh, went to Oshnavieh with two 75mm cannons.
In Oshnavieh, we rented a room in a mud-brick house. There was a woman named Dora Baji. She was a Kurdish woman. For about four months, all ten of us lived in this room. We would buy food for this woman, and she would cook for us, and we would give her two tomans a day for the rent and her services.
Living conditions were extremely difficult. There was no cleanliness, no bathroom, and no toilet; there were many lice and fleas, and we were young. If there were lice, there was also laughter.
Every day, we would often go to the council room and consult with Sheikh Ahmed. There, they would host us with tea. If the weather was nice, Tafrashian, Rais Dana, and Dabaghzadeh would go out with the skilled Barzani gunmen and teach them how to load and unload the cannons and perform military drills.
While we were in Oshnavieh, one day a sturdy young Kurd came to us and introduced himself as Saeed. He said he had come to Oshnavieh from the Kurdistan Democratic Party of Iraq to see General Mullah Mustafa, and he also brought us a good message from the central committee of that party. Until the start of the war between the Iranian army and the Barzanis on March 15, 1947 (24th of Esfand 1325), he came to Oshnavieh several times. Once, when heavy snow had fallen, Saeed had made his way to Oshnavieh through the Zagros mountain ranges, where he said he would sink into the snow up to his waist in many places, and he brought us fifty Iraqi dinars as aid from the Kurdistan Democratic Party. He was a brave and courageous young man. Later, when the Palestine war started and martial law was declared in Iraq, Saeed was also arrested, and Ali Asghari saw him in the central prison of Baghdad.
Helping the Barzanis
Our job was to assist the Barzanis in administrative work. Ehsan had become the head of the court for violations of the law. If someone had a complaint, they would come to him. For example: two farmers from Oshnavieh, if they had a fight or if someone had stolen something, they would come to Ehsan, and he would pass judgment. Our friend Arteshiar was in charge of customs, meaning that for the goods that came from Urmia to Oshnavieh, he would collect customs duties for the Barzanis so they could manage. I had become the mayor of Oshnavieh. The mayor's work was not much of a job, meaning it was not development work. I would set the prices of goods and give them to the town crier to announce to the people in a loud voice. For example, I would say today meat with bone is this much per kilo and without bone is this much. I would set the price of kebab, for example, two skewers of kebab with a piece of bread for five qiran. In return for these services of ours, the Barzanis would give us a ration of over two tomans daily. In those difficult circumstances, it was good that we stayed alive. Of course, the situation of the Barzanis was different from ours. Because of many years of displacement and homelessness, they would go to any village, fire a few bullets into the sky, and with the guidance of the village head or their own preference, they would be distributed among the houses of the village, and the people of the villages would provide them with food and lodging. Of course, most of the farmers of Kurdistan lived in poverty and their houses were made of raw bricks and mud, the path to the guest room and the stable for livestock were connected, and because of the steam from the large animals, their rooms would become warm, and also they would be saved from the nightly theft of livestock.
These fellow citizens of ours lived in such poverty and lack of a healthy life, and we, with our pure belief and feeling, even if we had died of hunger, could not have imposed ourselves on the hardworking families. We wanted to have fair behavior and buy our necessities with our own consent and desire. This situation lasted for nearly three months, until the Iranian army started its attack on the Barzanis on the 24th of Esfand 1325 (1947).
Ahmadi: What were Mullah Mustafa Barzani's negotiations with the central government in Tehran and his words after returning to Oshnavieh?
Zarabakht: Mullah Mustafa and his companions returned from Tehran in the second half of Bahman 1325 (1947). General Mullah Mustafa, after his return, invited the officers and some of his leaders to a party one night. In that party, which included his own officers and a group of Barzani leaders and us, he discussed his negotiations with the Shah, Qavam al-Saltaneh the Prime Minister, and Razmara the Chief of Army, and said: They took us to see the air force, the ammunition manufacturing factory, and other military locations; they showed us those places with the intention of demonstrating their power. Our later meeting was with the Shah. In that meeting, the Shah said: We are ready to give you a safe place around Hamadan so you can farm, lay down your weapons, and engage in your normal lives.
General Mullah Mustafa said: Regarding coming to Hamadan, I said: I accept this proposal, but ultimately my older brother Sheikh Ahmed must decide, because he is the worldly and spiritual leader of the tribe. I must convince him of this proposal. The Shah agreed for me to do this. Then I said to the Shah: Until this proposal is implemented, give us some food, because our families are living in a very dire situation. The Shah said: Fine, but on the condition that you also return the officers of the Iranian army and their cannons to the army. In response, I said, Your Majesty! You should not agree to the honor of the Barzani tribe being lost and us being subjected to a barrage of insults and curses from future generations. The customs of the Barzani tribe are not such that it hands over its guest to its enemy. I am ready to hand over eighteen people from my sons and grandsons to you in place of those six escaped officers, but you must forgive me regarding the handing over of those six officers.
Ahmadi: There were ten officers with Mullah Mustafa, why did you mention six?
Zarabakht: We meant the escaped officers of the army; these were in addition to the division officers who, in the opinion of the army, an officer who has escaped from the army is not known as an officer.
Ahmadi: Was Mullah Mustafa's (food) proposal accepted?
Zarabakht: Yes, after Mullah Mustafa's return from Tehran, according to the agreement that had been made, the Barzanis, in exchange for some flour and grain, vacated Naghadeh and the area under their control was limited to Oshnavieh and its surroundings.
Ahmadi: What did Mullah Mustafa do after returning from Tehran regarding the possibility of an Iranian attack in the winter?
Zarabakht: During that period, which was nearly three months since the settlement of the Barzanis in Oshnavieh, both sides had done things. The army had started preparing and arming the tribe of that region that were supporters of the central government. Mullah Mustafa also went to the north (Targavar region) to talk to the leaders of the Herki and Shekak tribes. His intention was for them to cooperate and allow the Barzanis to pass through this region and reach the northern region. Tivai and I went with Mullah Mustafa as far as Silvana.
Ahmadi: Was the goal of the Barzanis going to the northern region and leaving from that area a preparation for the march towards the Soviet Union, or coming into the territory of Iraq?
Zarabakht: Mullah Mustafa was in favor of going to the Soviet Union, but his brother Sheikh Ahmed was opposed. Sheikh Ahmed had a spiritual position and was the leader of the tribe, and Mullah Mustafa could not do anything without his consent. Of course, military work and planning operations, etc., were things that Mullah Mustafa did, and he did not consult with him on these types of tasks. He had long shown that he was a good commander and warrior, but regarding these types of decisions and going to such a region, the final decision was in the hands of Sheikh Ahmed. We were in favor of going to the Soviet Union. Mullah Mustafa would say: Go and convince my brother.
Tudeh officers against each other
On the 24th of Esfand 1325 (1947 AD), a clash occurred between the Barzanis and the army units and armed tribes in the Targavar region, in which the Barzanis were forced to retreat.
On that very day in Nelos, between Naghadeh and Oshnavieh, a clash occurred where thirty of the Barzanis, with the support of Tafrashian's artillery, were able to destroy a brigade of the army and take many of them prisoner.
When Tiva and I returned to Oshnavieh, we saw that they had taken about three hundred people prisoner and had locked them in the Oshnavieh mosque. When we questioned them, it turned out that this brigade had set out from Sufian, and their commander was Major Kalashi. He had been wounded in that clash and had killed himself before being taken prisoner. Later, they said that Major Kalashi had been one of the officers of the Tudeh Party; we did not have that information at the time.
With the defeat of this army brigade, five officers, seventeen non-commissioned officers, and three hundred soldiers were taken prisoner. They captured two 75mm mountain guns, two mortar launchers, and some artillery and mortar shells and military equipment. The officers were: Captain Physician Khodadost, First Lieutenant Kamali, commander of the artillery platoon, First Lieutenant of Infantry Basirat, First Lieutenant of Infantry Fatehi, and First Lieutenant of Infantry Mirhamzeh Yaqubi, commander of the mortar brigade.
Ahmadi: Was Major Mirhamzeh Yaqubi a member of the military organization of the Tudeh Party and not one of the officials of that party?
Zarabakht: Yes, he was a member of the military organization of the Tudeh Party, but it seems that at that time he had not yet become a member of the organization or he was not revealing that he was a Tudeh member.
In any case, Mahmoud Tavakkoli lines them up and brings them from the Nelos area to Oshnavieh. The officers, before being captured, take off their officer uniforms and put on soldier uniforms so that they are not Known as officers.
When we went to the Oshnavieh mosque, the officers could not be identified among those three hundred people, but we recognized them. We reassured the officers that the Barzanis had nothing to do with them, because the army had sent them, they were now taken prisoner, and they were not being treated badly along with the other prisoners. Despite this, we reassured them that as long as we were there, they should not worry. We were comforting them.
I remember we had bought a chicken, we really liked its meat, and we gave it to them.
In connection with these prisoners, I remember one day a Hind-type fighter plane appeared in the sky over Oshnavieh. From that height, the pilot saw a group of soldiers who had gathered in the courtyard of the mosque. The plane made a turn and descended until it reached the mosque and dropped something rolled up. We picked it up and opened it; it was a letter congratulating the brave officers and soldiers of Iran on the recapture of Oshnavieh. I remember the name of the pilot and the observer of the plane (Captain Khosravi), which was written at the bottom of the letter. I think that upon their return, they had reported this discovery to the army headquarters.
The second phase of the war between the Barzanis and the Iranian army
About ten days after the defeat of that army brigade—on the third day of Farvardin 1326 (1948 AD)—a group of cavalry from the army forces on the northern front, commanded by First Lieutenant Emami and supported by a group equipped with heavy sixty-round weapons, attacked with the intention of capturing the heights of Halej. This military unit suddenly, without expecting it, faced the fire of the Barzanis. In this operation, Emami and thirteen of his comrades were killed. The commander of the cavalry group, Second Lieutenant Hamid Jahanbani, the son of Army General Amanollah Jahanbani, and fifteen of his soldiers were taken prisoner and sent to the Oshnavieh prisoner camp.
Dealing with more than 300 prisoners, protecting them, and providing food was a major problem for the Barzanis. On the ninth or tenth day of Farvardin, after we (the officers) returned from the heights of Sufian—which was the operational front east of Oshnavieh—we went to see Sheikh Ahmad. We suggested to him that to reduce the problem of food and the protection of the prisoners, he should agree to release the soldiers and non-commissioned officers and keep only the officers. Sheikh Ahmad approved this proposal. The soldiers and non-commissioned officers were released near the Naghadeh front.
The final phase of the Military operation on Iranian soil
General Mullah Mustafa was on the northern front, and we were in the south. The commander of the Oshnavieh front, Tafrashian, instructed him to take up a position on the western heights of Sufian with one 75mm gun and support the Barzanis' operations to capture the Sufian garrison with his fire. During the time I was with Tafrashian, I had learned a little about firing artillery. Tafrashian gave me one of the guns we had captured, and together with Dabaghzadeh and several capable Barzanis—who had also learned to fire artillery—we went to an area called Sulduz.
Artillery Colonel Ezzat Abdulaziz and First Lieutenant Rais Dana were active with their guns in different parts of the front, but the pressure of the Iranian army, the quality of their weapons, and their use of tanks and aircraft had faced the Barzanis with a shortage of food, weapons, and ammunition, and problems with their families. These obstacles had forced them to retreat gradually. Those Peshmerga who had been sent to the front lines were always thinking about their families. Often, to attend to the daily affairs of their families' lives, they would return from the war to see what had happened to them. In this Situation, another group would go to war in their place, and this rotation was always ongoing.
Gradually, the circle of the siege was tightening, and the Iranian army forces were advancing. On the fourteenth of Farvardin, Dabaghzadeh, the artillery group, and I went to Oshnavieh. At night, we went to Dorabaji's house and slept there—in fact, we had come to place the guns in the orchards of Oshnavieh to defend against the Iranian army's attack. In the morning, when we woke up, we saw that no one was left. Only these artillerymen who were with us remained; Oshnavieh had become like a dead city. No one was left in it. We unloaded the gun at the foot of the Oshnavieh heights next to the trees.
The next morning, I saw a group of tribal horsemen who were in the service of the army—I believe they were the Mamesh tribe—preparing to set out. In fact, the army was sending them ahead to investigate the nature of the operation and, after obtaining information through them, to design the attack plan. After firing a few shots, retreating, and frightening them, we loaded our cannon onto a mule and climbed the mountain on the western slope of the town of Oshnavieh, which was part of the Zardkuh mountain range and a branch of the Zagros, reaching the border of Iraq.
General Mullah Mustafa was in the northern battlefield from the Targavar plain. In fact, during the operation, he was tasked with retreating so that the families could reach the border safely. The families, with their belongings, in that snow and bitter cold, carved a path for themselves in those heights and set off toward the Gadar valley. We were with them too. Our march in those rugged and snow-covered heights of the Zagros lasted a total of eleven days.
Ahmadi: In those difficult conditions, how was the provision of food and your retreat?
Zarrbakht: During these eleven days, there was neither a place to sleep nor food to save us from hunger. We were out day and night. We had made a bag out of cloth and put roasted wheat in it and ate it instead of food. The Kurds had also made flatbread and were eating it, and we would tell them: We are artillery officers and your guests, and we have no bread to eat. The women would give us one or two pieces of bread. One afternoon, we had spread our tablecloth and were busy eating when the air attack by the Hinde fighter jets began.
Sheikh Ahmed had sent a message to the army commander through Seyed Taha al-Gaylani, the head of the Herki Kurdish tribes, that he was ready to hand over the captured officers to the army, on the condition that the planes would not bomb them. The army took back the officers but did not keep its promise. That day, when we were busy eating lunch, a plane appeared above our heads. The plane dived, which was a sign of shooting or bombing. First, we moved away from the tablecloth and hid in rock crevices. Mahmoud Tavakkoli and I were in a rock crevice. When the plane dived and pulled up, I saw it drop two twelve-kilogram bombs. Tavakkoli was about to get up, I pulled him down quickly because the plane had not finished its work yet. At this moment, the bombs hit the snow and exploded. An old Barzani man who was standing was hit by a piece of a bomb on his head and was killed instantly. We saw this with our own eyes. We quickly ran down toward the boulders, and another group fled upward. The second time, the bombs exploded near us. It happened again. A woman who was walking with her child was hit by a piece of a bomb in her hand, and her hand hung down. Again, we hid in the rock crevices. For another time, it dropped two more bombs and left.
After the plane left, we came out of the rock crevices and saw Ezzat Ali Asghari with a piece of iron in his thigh. The Barzanis had a bandage like the bandages we had. Yes, this medic came and took a probe out of his bag and inserted it into Ali Asghari's thigh; no matter how much he turned it, he could not remove the piece of iron.
Ahmadi: Did they have any skin anesthetic?
Zarrbakht: No, Ali Asghari was screaming and moaning. He could not move. His thigh had swollen and become as big as a small pillow. We thought it best to hand him over to the Iraqis at the Iraq border. We put him on a mule and gave him to the first Iraqi outpost so they could treat him.
They took him to Baghdad, performed surgery, and he recovered. We found out about this later. After his recovery, a Baghdad court sentenced him to three months for crossing the border. After this period, they transferred him to Abu Ghraib prison to join us.
Again, the next morning, a plane appeared in the sky. On the days we were on the battlefield, planes would come, but they would drop bombs and bullets elsewhere on the fields and had nothing to do with us. We would tell our friends: The pilot of this plane is one of the Tudeh officers. That is why he does not attack us, he is only doing his duty to get it over with.
On the third day of the air operation, a plane was at an altitude of seven to eight hundred meters in the sky. The Barzani Kurds were so angry at yesterday's bombing that they were all shooting at this plane.
We told our friend: Shooting at a plane from this distance is useless. The chance of hitting it is one in a million. This is a waste of bullets. At this moment, the plane dived toward the plains and someone ejected with a parachute. The plane fell and turned into a ball of fire. I said a bullet must have hit a sensitive spot and the plane became uncontrollable and fell, or the pilot was hit by a bullet. Yes, later it became clear to us that the deputy officer who was sitting in the observer's seat ejected with a parachute, and the pilot was First Lieutenant Gholamhossein Najmi, who was one of our Tudeh friends.
Ahmadi: This story is part of that great tragedy of how the officers of the Tudeh Party's military organization stand against each other against their will.
Last interview with General Mullah Mustafa
Zarrbakht: During the march, the final days of our stay in Iran were spent passing by the banks of the Gadar River, which was the border line. Mullah Mustafa sent one of his armed men to find Tafarsian. Tafarsian was our spokesperson. Mullah Mustafa said to Tafarsian: "My family, Sheikh Ahmed, and a group of old men and women are going back to Iraq to surrender, but I and a group of Peshmerga will not do that, and we want to return to Iraqi territory as armed men and continue the struggle; perhaps we can do something so that those who surrendered to Iraq can come and live in the Barzan region. Are you prepared to come with us in this struggle on Iraqi soil?" Tafarsian said: "We have no other way; wherever you go, we are with you." Mullah Mustafa said: "We are walking on the path of death. If we have a piece of bread, we will eat it together. Our death and life will be together." Tafarsian said: "Mr. Barzani! Has it not been like this until now? We welcome this proposal with the utmost pleasure." Mullah Mustafa and his companions wanted to enter Iraqi territory as armed men. They were saying: We will become "outlaws". They used an Arabic word that meant exactly the word rebel ."
Ahmadi: In Tafarsian's command, was the artillery used in the fighting, even inside Iraqi territory?
Zarbakht: We could not take the artillery with us. The cannons were heavy and had to be carried by mules. We entered Iraqi territory only with light weapons. Tafarsian disabled the cannons so that the Iranian Military could not use them.
We all welcomed this proposal by General Mullah Mustafa; we would certainly have been executed in Iran.
Iraq was also under British rule. We did not trust them; we were sure they would hand us back to the government of the Levant.
On the 25th of Farvardin 1325 (1947), the entire Barzani family crossed the Gadar border bridge and surrendered to Iraq. Mullah Mustafa said to us: "I believe that you should become refugees in Iraq. Iraqi law will support you; they cannot hand you over because you have not committed a crime in Iraq, but our situation is different from yours. We are sentenced to death in three Countries because we are fighting against the Military of Iraq, Iran, and Turkey. In my opinion, it is better for you to go and become refugees in Iraq."
After hearing these words from General Mullah Mustafa, we came and talked together and decided that it was better not to do this and to follow them.
That evening, General Mullah Mustafa and five hundred of his companions climbed the heights north of the Gadar Valley. We followed them.
Ahmadi: What was the reason for Mullah Mustafa changing his mind in the second meeting, when he suggested that you go and ask for political asylum from the Iraqi government?
Zarbakht: On that day, we reached the conclusion that, first, we no longer had the same Military value for the Barzanis as before. Because we had disabled and destroyed the cannons. In terms of guerrilla position, we did not have the same value as the Barzani armed men; in fact, we were holding them back. Third, we had the label of communist on our foreheads, and this could have weakened General Mullah Mustafa's position in the event of negotiations with the Iraqi government—which was appointed by Britain. If an agreement were to be made with the Iraqi government, he would have been forced to hand us over to the Iraqi government. This was contrary to the customs of the Barzan tribe and the Support for refugees who sought shelter with them.
Ahmadi: This question arises for me: General Mullah Mustafa wanted to become a refugee in the Soviet Union and did so, especially since he had made this proposal to you as well. Why did he suggest that you become refugees in Iraq?
Zarbakht: At that time, Mullah Mustafa had not decided to go to the Soviet Union. He was trying at that time to strengthen his position in Iraq so that they could negotiate with the Iraqi government. When he realized that he would not be successful in this regard and that they would betray him and that they were in danger, about a month and a few days later, they were forced to reach the Soviet Union by marching.
Yes, as I said, we followed them that evening. That night, Tafarsian had a fever; he was burning up. It was a cold night and we reached the location of the Herki tents. Everywhere we looked, a fire was lit and it was full of people, but we could not find a place. We found Sheikh Suleiman, the uncle of General Mullah Mustafa, who was a political advisor, and told him that Tafarsian was sick and had a fever. That night, somehow, we shoved Tafarsian into a tent in that snow and cold, and we ourselves shivered in the cold until morning.
Requesting political asylum in Iraq
In the twilight of the morning, we held a meeting and decided that instead of the danger of surrendering in Iran, we would request political asylum in Iraq.
That same day, we descended towards the Gadar Valley. We sent Tiwa, who held the rank of Major, as a representative from the group to contact the Iraqi border guards. The Iraqi Major reported our request by telegram to the Ministry of Interior. After a few hours, our answer was as follows: "The asylum request of the Iranian officers is accepted and they will be treated according to the law. Signed: Minister of Interior, Salih Jabr."
On the 26th of Farvardin 1325 (1947), we handed over our weapons to the Iraqi border station and, by requesting political asylum, entrusted ourselves to an unknown fate. At that time, Nuri al-Said was the Prime Minister of Iraq and Salih Jabr was the Minister of Interior. Later, Salih Jabr became Prime Minister and Nuri al-Said was behind the scenes.
Then they took us with respect to the first gendarmerie station, where we slept that night. The next morning, two people handcuffed us and brought us to a place called Bapshitan, which was a Military camp. From there, they put us in a vehicle and brought us to Kirkuk.
From Kirkuk, they took us by train, where they had tied our handcuffs to the seats of the train, to Baghdad to prison.
The march of General Mullah Mustafa and his Peshmerga to the Soviet Union
Ahmadi: On the 26th of Farvardin 1325 (1947 AD), the fate of you ten officers, Sheikh Ahmed, and part of the Barzanis who surrendered to the Iraqi government, and the fate of General Mullah Mustafa and his companions, were each different. Can you tell us if you were aware of their fate later?
Zarbakht: Yes, I will tell you very briefly. Sheikh Ahmed Barzani, after surrendering to the state of Iraq, was imprisoned in Baghdad and Basra until 1958, and when Abd al-Karim Qasim staged a coup, he was released. Of course, the prison was a house that had been turned into a prison. His brother Sheikh Muhammad Sadiq, Hama Agha of Mergasor, and their family were under surveillance in the camps of Mosul and Kirkuk. Four Iraqi officers who had surrendered with Sheikh Ahmed, namely Staff Colonel Izzat Abdulaziz, Major Mustafa Khoshnaw, Captain Khairullah Baban, and Lieutenant Muhammad Mahmud, were executed after a trial. Regarding General Mullah Mustafa and his companions who went to the Soviet Union, I later obtained some documents, and I will publish them in a book.
Ahmadi: That is an interesting task, I hope it reaches the readers. Of course, I heard some general things from Ghani Bolurian.
Zarbakht: I started the work from several sides. Collecting newspapers, through documents and the accounts of some people and government documents. For example: through the family of Brigadier Vosough, who later became the Chief of Staff and Minister of War. He was a member of the commission that investigated the issue of the escape of the Barzanis, how they were able to overcome all the obstacles and cross the Aras. The members of this commission were: Chief of Staff Shahbakhti, Major General Khosravani, Brigadier Vosough, and Brigadier Gorzan. I obtained the reports of Major General Homayouni, who was the commander of the forces in the region, and the reports of Colonel Firoozi, the head of the center of that force. After these, there were a group of Barzanis in Azimieh, Karaj, and I interviewed two of them.
Ahmadi: Does that mean you did this work and organized the documents just in these recent years?
Zarbakht: Yes, in the year 1372 (1994 AD), that is two years ago, and 48 years have passed since that time. We interviewed two of them; one was a Peshmerga who was eighteen years old at the time, named Kazim Shaneh-Dari, he is now 66 years old. The other one was Kaka Hasomir Khan, a young man of 23-24 years old, he is now nearly 70 years old. Now I will tell you a summary of that march:
At that time, according to my list, the Barzanis were 502 people. First, they enter Iraqi territory and the Barzan region and disperse. They have no fighting or clashes with the border forces of the Iraqi army. General Mullah Mustafa waited to see what the Iraqis would do. They came from the Iraqi army and made contact with him. They even brought with them two of the Barzanis who had surrendered to the Iraqi state with Sheikh Ahmed. They had come to see how many armed men General Mullah Mustafa had. In fact, they wanted to evaluate them.
After a month passed, General Mullah Mustafa was surrounded and realized that with that small amount of weapons and ammunition, he could not cope, and Sheikh Ahmed was in prison, so he decided directly regarding these 502 people to head towards the Soviet Union. They entered Turkish territory from the village of Bedav [second of Khordad 1325] (1947 AD) on the border of Iraq and Turkey, then they came to Iranian territory, and in Iranian Kurdistan, they went to the village of Jermi. In this march, through the heights, rivers, and snowy mountains, and by building snow stairs in the mountains of Turkey, they returned to Iranian territory [sixth of Khordad 1325] (1947 AD).
The Iranian army knew that the Barzanis had come to Iranian territory armed, and from the army headquarters, they ordered them to set up a defensive line in three different areas in front of them. The most important area for setting up the defensive line was at Qotur Chay. The Iranian army commanders had deployed their forces in the region so that they would not be attacked by the Barzanis in any place. Because they had previously tasted the blow of the Barzanis. As the army was stabilizing, the Barzanis were passing through the ravines and valleys. During the day, they hid under boulders so that the air force would not see them and they could continue their march at night. Ten of them had been wounded. They were carrying the corpses from village to village. In a place called Shutt [Khordad 1325] (1947 AD), they clashed with the Iranian army and about thirty to forty people from the Iranian army were killed. The Barzanis captured that bridge and crossed from there at night and reached a village called Hasoon. Three days later, they reached the Aras River, the water border of Iran and the Soviet Union.
Captain Mirhaj thought of making rafts from goat skins; they fill the rafts with air and cross with them and contact the Soviet border guards, and Moscow informs them that we cannot provide you with any kind of help in your crossing of the river; but if you cross yourselves, then there are no obstacles in your way to enter Soviet territory.
First, Mirhaj and two others cross, then the others, and after everyone, Mullah Mustafa crosses.
- Murtaza Zarbakht was born in 1300 Solar Hijri (1922 AD) into a family in Tehran. He finished his primary and secondary education at the military school and in 1319 Solar Hijri (1941 AD) went to the Officers' University, Aviation Department. In Mehr 1321 Solar Hijri (1943 AD), he finished university with the rank of Second Lieutenant and became an officer in the Isfahan Air Force.
In Farvardin 1325 (1947 AD), with a higher rank, and because the Democratic Government of Azerbaijan needed aircraft, he took on the execution of this mission, and together with First Lieutenant Ali Judi, they flew with two fighter jets towards Azerbaijan and joined the Democratic Government of Azerbaijan and established the air force of the division's army.
On 19 November 1325 (1947 AD), for an assigned task, he and two of his pilot friends went to Saqqez, where they heard the news of the fall of the Azerbaijan government and the flight of Jafar Pishevari. From that day (19/9/1325) (1947 AD), his fate and that of nine other fugitive officers became linked to the Barzanis and their political and military leader, namely General Mustafa Barzani, and for four and a half months in the vicinity of the Oshnavieh region and the heights of the Zagros border, they faced the well-armed Iranian army alongside the Barzanis. Then, out of necessity, he became a refugee in Iraq and was imprisoned for three years in the prisons of Baghdad and Samarra, and in Farvardin 1329 (1951), they handed him over to the Iranian border guards at the Khosravi border.
[1] Haji Ali Razmara was a general, political figure, and Minister of the Shah of Iran; he also had a hand in suppressing the Simko Shikak revolution, and was later assassinated by Khalil Tahmasebi, one of the members of the (Fada'iyan-e Islam) group.
[2] The Avtomat is a Russian weapon similar to an Uzi, whose magazine is like a devil's horn.
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