One of the most important battles that took place in the Erbil Brigade, which had a direct impact on changing the course of events and the revolution in South Kurdistan, was the Battle of Handren. The government's strategic goal for occupying Mount Handren was the presence of the Kurdish revolution's command center and the decision-making headquarters for Barzani in the Balakayati region. The Battle of Mount Handren was a balance of power between the Kurdistan revolution forces and the Iraqi Army. Seizing the mountain and the withdrawal of Peshmerga forces from it would have posed a direct threat to Barzani's headquarters and the headquarters of the Iraqi Communist Party, which had its main base at the foot and shadow of the mountain, due to the mountain's strategy. The government had been trying to control it since Year 1965.
On the other hand, occupying Mount Handren meant separating Soran from Badinan, as the government's specific goal was to separate Badinan from the leadership of the Kurdish revolution, which had its main headquarters in the Balakayati region.
The government exploited the divisions within Kurdistan Democratic Party, which had erupted earlier in Year 1964. After their separation, they presented themselves as a group for the Party's Political Bureau and eventually joined the government, becoming armed and supporting the government against the Kurdish revolution led by Barzani. This was another incentive for the government to try to end the revolution with higher morale and a well-knit plan. They had prepared for an intensive and large-scale attack on Kurdistan since the beginning of Year 1966, until April 15-16, 1966, was set to carry out the attack.
It is mentioned that the Minister of Defense, Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Aziz al-Uqaili, was the one who developed the plan, and the military plan was named (I rely on God). The government was convinced of the plan's success, to the point that the Iraqi ambassador in Tehran, on the day (C) the attack began, had sent a memorandum to the Iranian government demanding that the remnants of the rebel forces not be allowed to enter the country after their defeat, and specifically demanding that Mullah Mustafa Barzani not be granted asylum.
This means that the government was proud of its plan, because the map was drawn by experts and organized with the finest details to the smallest point, and the attack on Mount Handren had not been, until then, launched by the government with such a large-scale attack on the liberated areas.
Their military plan aimed to give an important role to the separatist group of the Political Bureau, and the army would also attack the Zozik and Handren mountains in the Rawanduz region, and thus Erbil, Sulaymaniyah, and Kirkuk would be separated from Mosul, Zakho, and Duhok. At the same time, the revolution forces would be struck from the rear by the separatist group of the Political Bureau and the tribal leaders affiliated with the government in the region, and they would advance towards Barzani's headquarters. The Iraqi Army General Staff chose six brigades from two divisions for this purpose.
The plan was implemented and April 15, 1966, was set for the comprehensive attack, but the plan was postponed after the helicopter of Abdul Salam Arif fell two days earlier and he died, i.e., on April 13, 1966, from the scheduled date. Although the new president, Abdul Rahman Arif, who took power after his brother's death, tried to negotiate and reach an agreement, he failed to overcome the senior army officers who insisted on implementing the suspended plan, and as a result of the pressure, the president was convinced to implement the plan.
The Iraqi government had prepared two military divisions to attack Rawanduz. The first division consisted of brigades (1, 14, 15) and was led by Zaki Hussein Hilmi, and the second division consisted of brigades (3, 4, 5) led by Staff Major General Ibrahim Faisal al-Ansari. In early May, on the night of the 2nd/3rd, they launched a large-scale attack with the help of a large number of mercenaries and with the support of artillery and helicopters. The Iraqi Army advanced on the fronts of Kork, Wadi Akoyan, Zozik, and Handren and was able in these attacks to occupy Mount Handren. The task of protecting the region at that time was entirely on the shoulders of the Kurdistan revolution army, but most of Mount Handren was in the hands of the Peshmerga of the Iraqi Communist Party, while on the other hand, Mount Zozik was the responsibility of Kurdistan Democratic Party. The Khoshnawti forces, the Erbil plain, the Barzan forces, and the Peshmerga of the region protected Zozik with blood, and after a fierce battle and fierce defense of the mountain, the army was unable to occupy Zozik, due to the defense of a number of Peshmerga commanders, including Haji Birokhi and Aziz Khani Mahajer, from the Omar Agha pass and the foot of Zozik, as well as Artillery of the Revolution which supported the Peshmerga forces by Hali Dolmari and Omar Osman.
And about this battle also, in a letter from Idris Barzani sent on the night of May 11-12, 1966, to Masoud Barzani, he points out that one of those who played a major role in the defense of Mount Zozik was the force of Mam Wasu Dizeyi and the commander of the Sefin forces battalion, Mustafa Haji Amin. Despite the wide attack launched by the government army, the commanders of the two Erbil plain force battalions, Corporal Osman Yusuf and Hassan Ali, were able to defend strongly and repel the attack. A force from the First Army led by Faris Kormarki also participated and played a witnessed role, and thus was able to defend Mount Zozik, but without this defense, the army was able to occupy many strategic military positions on Mount Handren. From this initial victory achieved by the government in Handren, Major General Saeed Hammo said, "I will not shave my beard until I reach Galala."
It is worth noting that Idris Barzani was appointed as general supervisor of the battle front by Mullah Mustafa Barzani, and this is clearly shown through many private letters exchanged between him and the Peshmerga commanders on the battle fronts, such as the letter addressed from Izzat Sulaiman Beg Dargala to Idris Barzani. The letter, dated May 5, 1966, informed him of the plight of the Peshmerga and asked him to meet some of their needs, and the next day Idris Barzani responded and fulfilled all his demands. In another letter sent by Idris Barzani to Rais Kamal, Lieutenant Rahman, Saeed Ahmed Agha Mergasori, Corporal Yunis, Mam Elias, Mam Sadiq, and Izzat Sulaiman Beg, he asked them: "Mount Handren must be recaptured by any means possible, even if it is with blood, because there is no other choice." On the other hand, and because of the sudden situation that arose due to the seizure of Mount Handren, Idris Barzani decided to appoint Fakher Hamad Agha Mergasori as general responsible for the Peshmerga forces on Mount Handren, and asked all commanders to fully comply with the directives by any means possible.
After several meetings between the military commanders of the Kurdistan revolution, it was decided to divide the battle front as follows:
Ismat Dino Zakhoyi's faction to the rear front of Bishok village, the Fourth Company of the Communist Party to the front of the Martyrs' Cave, another Peshmerga faction led by Lieutenant Rahman to the front of Qalatga and Chaqla Mir Ibrahim, and the last of the fronts for the Eleventh Company of the Communist Party with the Fourth Battalion, the first was under the supervision of Mam Sadiq and the second by Izzat Sulaiman Beg Dargala, and a squad supervised by Salih Akoyi cooperated with them.
Finally, on the eleventh of May, Mullah Mustafa Barzani with the leaders of the battle front, and after confirming the victory, the zero hour had struck at four o'clock in the afternoon of the following day. Fakher Hamad Agha Mergasori, Kamal Numan, Numan Alwan known as Lieutenant Khidr, and Izzat Suleiman Beg led the attack, which began after heavy shelling of the Iraqi Army positions,
The Peshmerga recorded a great victory, and the army's losses reached about 400 killed and 600 wounded, with the seizure of large quantities of weapons and ammunition. Due to the increase in the number of wounded in the ranks of the Iraqi Army, Mosul, Kirkuk, and Sulaymaniyah were filled with corpses and the wounded, and some schools were evacuated to shelter the wounded in them. It is worth noting that although the Peshmerga achieved a great victory, Barzani was not happy because of this huge number of deaths in the ranks of the Iraqi Army, as they became victims of the Baghdad government's policy, and he did not want bloodshed. He also expressed his belief that the Kurdish issue would be resolved through negotiations with the Iraqi government.
The Peshmerga's losses in the battles of Handren and Zozik included the martyrdom of a number of leaders and Peshmerga, including Naji Birokhi, Ahmed Haji Muhammad, Mikhail..., Corporal Yunis Hawleri (Company Commander), Khidr Awla Beg Dargalayi (Company Commander), and Salih Mam Elias Rawanduzi (Platoon Commander). . . . . . Eight Peshmerga members were wounded, namely: Ali Hini Dargalayi, Mustafa Qadir Chawrash, Ismail Nasrallah known as Mahmoud Dictatorov, Hasana Shal Qarachtani, Hussein Mahmoud Kilitiyi, Omar Qarachtani, Saeed Abdul Razzaq Dargalayi, and Saeed Hamad Agha Mergasori.. and many others.
The Peshmerga forces regained these areas suddenly, as the Iraqi government suffered heavy material and human losses in the Battle of Handren, which was a unique military operation. Even the French writer René Maurice, who lived in the midst of the war, devoted a special part of his book to the day of the Peshmerga's victory, and described it as (Judgment Day).
After the end of the Battle of Handren, Barzani proposed a 24-hour ceasefire to allow for the burial and transport of the bodies of the Iraqi Army dead, so that the International Committee of the Red Cross could carry out this task. This call by Barzani shows the true face of the Kurdistan revolution, that the revolution would adhere to the law of war and international treaties, and this call sparked beautiful reactions in Geneva.
This victory led to the admission of senior army leaders, such as the former Minister of Defense Abdul Aziz al-Uqaili, in the first government formation of Abdul Rahman al-Bazzaz, when he was appointed on October 21-22, 1966. He delivered a long speech at the Republican Palace meetings, and although he accused Barzani, the Kurdish liberation movement, and the historical concepts of the Kurdish revolution in various ways, he said in part of his speech: "When we planned the (Spring) campaign with the aim of advancing towards Barzan, it was possible to guarantee victory within three months if the Situation remained as it was and I remained in power. On April 13, 1966, the advance towards Barzan was successful, but the death of President Abdul Salam Arif returned things to their normal state, so we handed over the responsibility to others, and the army lost the Battle of Handren in a strange and unexpected way." This humiliating defeat prompted the former Prime Minister to issue a twelve-point statement on June 29, 1966, which was in fact a complete surrender of the government without the rebels committing to it.
Although the speech comes within the framework of self-defense, it is also an explicit admission of the great defeat suffered by the Iraqi Army at the hands of one of the enemies of the Kurdish liberation movement and the peaceful solution to its just cause.
The Battle of Handren was one of the most important battles in which the Kurdistan Peshmerga forces achieved great victories during five years of armed fighting with various Iraqi regimes, which proved that the liberation movement of the Kurdish people was able to impose its power more than before, as a Military force and a factor that the government cannot ignore.
Thus, the joint defense and attack of the Communist Party and Kurdistan Democratic Party in the Battle of Handren showed the people of Kurdistan a beautiful model of joint national struggle between Kurds and Arabs, because the Communist Party forces in the region used and played an effective role as part of the Kurdistan revolution movement, while previously and after the fall of the Abdul Karim Qasim regime, headquarters were opened for them and they were sheltered by Barzani and the Kurdish Politician leadership.
Sources:1- Shwan Muhammad Amin Taha Khoshnaw, Erbil between the years 1963 – 1970, (Salahaddin University Press - Erbil - 2016).
2- Abdullah Ahmed Rasul Pishdari, My Memoirs, Volume 3, unpublished.
3- Günter Deschner, The Kurds: A Betrayed and Wronged People, trans: Hama Karim Arif, (Aras Agency - Erbil - 2004).
4- Abdulfattah Ali Botani, Avro Newspaper, No. 51, Duhok, July 2004.
5- René Maurice, Kurdistan or Death, trans: Abubakr Salih Ismail, (Khani Printing House, Duhok - Mukriyani Agency - Erbil - 2008).
6- Masoud Barzani, The Story of Handren: An Unprecedented Victory, Khabat Newspaper, No.: 3465, May 12, 2010.
7- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part One, September Revolution 1961-1975, First Edition, (2004).
8- Archive of the Encyclopedia Board of the Kurdistan Democratic Party.
9- Ghazi Adel Gardi, A Peshmerga in the Service of Barzani's Path... Haji Birokhi 1916 – 1975, Volume One, (Turkey - 2021).
10- Karwan Jawhar Muhammad, Idris Barzani 1944 – 1987: Life and Political and Military Role in the Kurdish Liberation Movement, (Hevi Printing House - Erbil - 2019).
11- Shirzad Zakaria Muhammad, The Kurdish National Movement in Kurdistan Iraq, February 8, 1963 – July 17, 1968, Spirez House for Printing and Publishing, Duhok, 2006.
12- Maghdid Haji, The First Phase of the September Revolution (1961-1970), History Journal, No: 14, Erbil, 2010.
13- Hawkar Karim Hama Sharif, The September Revolution, Salahaddin University Press, Erbil, 2012.