On June 3, 1962, the spark of the Aylul Revolution reached the Balakayati region, and the Peshmerga Forces, under the direct supervision of the leader of the revolution, Mullah Mustafa Barzani headed toward the Galala sub-district with the intention of liberating it. The sub-district police force wanted to resist and did not surrender. At that time, Barzani was monitoring the battle from Makosan. Through a letter, he informed the sub-district manager to surrender to the Peshmerga Forces so that the battle could end without bloodshed. On the night of June 3-4, 1962, a police outpost surrendered, but the sub-district manager, a company of police, the sub-district officials, and all those who considered themselves loyal to the government of Abd al-Karim Qasim (1958-1963), along with their families, secretly took refuge in the Rayat Castle, while the state's warplanes continued to bombard the Peshmerga Forces from morning until evening.
A large number of police were in the castle, whose officer in charge was a Kurd named Karim Khorani, but when the sub-district manager, who was an Arab and did not know the Kurdish language, arrived at the castle, he became the commander and the primary person in charge. On June 4, 1962, the Peshmerga Forces, under the command of Haji Berokhi, Sergeant Yasin, Mahmoud Kawani, Mustafa Nerwayi, Hassan Khal Hamza, Ahmed Masti, and Omar Dababa, along with several tribal forces, besieged the Rayat Castle.
The Peshmerga Forces tried to scare the police by shooting to force them to surrender, but those besieged refused to surrender and began to resist, requesting help from the government via radio. The Peshmerga were aware of all the government telegrams in which the besieged were requesting help, and the government, in its response, was demanding they resist and hold out, and they continued to resist. Some of the telegrams were addressed directly to Abd al-Karim Qasim, the Prime Minister of Iraq at that time.
The government of Iraq at that time used warplanes to continuously bomb the Peshmerga forces blindly, but it did not cause any damage to the Peshmerga. Furthermore, sometimes the planes would drop supplies, ammunition, and necessary equipment to the besieged using parachutes (nets). A small number of the parachutes reached them, and all the other parachutes fell into the hands of the Peshmerga. After two weeks of besieging the castle, a force of the Iraqi Army, commanded by Colonel Wahbi, consisting of the Third Battalion of the Third Brigade, set out from Rawanduz via the Bersirin road toward Rayat to break the siege and rescue the besieged.
A Peshmerga force, commanded by Mahmoud Kawani and Haris Bedaruni, blocked the Iraqi Army at Kospi Spi, Kospi Rola, and the Hafiz Bridge and confronted them. A fierce battle took place between them, and as a result, that battalion of the Iraqi Army was completely destroyed; some of their soldiers were killed, some were wounded, and some were taken prisoner. In this battle, it became clear to the Iraqi government that there was no hope of being able to reach Rayat through this route and break the siege on the castle, so it resorted to another method, which was using mercenaries who were in the Halgurd mountain opposite Rayat to suddenly attack the Peshmerga from behind and try to break the siege.
It is clear that to implement this plan, a group of mercenaries behind the Halgurd mountain had plans to attack, but when Barzani heard the news and learned of the plan, he entrusted the task of besieging the castle to Ali Askari and prepared himself to thwart this attempt by the government. With a Peshmerga force, he reached them in a short time. On June 27, 1962, in the area of Chigadari, Dol, Maydan, and Horni Balakian, they confronted them. After a fierce battle that lasted for three days, he scattered them and pursued them; some of them crossed the border and entered Iranian territory, and others snuck into the ravines and valleys of the Lolan area. In this way, the second attempt by the Iraqi government to break the siege failed.
After the Peshmerga tried every effort to get the besieged to surrender and their efforts were in vain, on June 10, 1962, by order of Barzani, they began digging a tunnel into the castle. By 16 Peshmerga and two master well-diggers from the East, who were also Peshmerga, they began digging the tunnel with picks, mattocks, shovels, and sacks, from a distance of 350 meters from a pit in the east of the castle toward the first tower of the castle, without any technical or engineering help, local or foreign. From time to time, they would make a hole and raise a red sign so they would know how much was left until they reached the castle. Within 32 days, the mouth of the tunnel reached the front of the first tower of the castle, outside and under the stone walls.
The red signs and the sound of the picks and shovels put great fear into the hearts of the police. Ali Askari and Ashraf Amedi went through the tunnel to the bottom of the castle wall. Together with the sub-district manager, they began a discussion from a small hole, that they had no other choice left, either they must surrender or they would plant TNT around all four walls of the castle and blow it up and collapse it on them. In another indication, it is stated that these two Peshmerga officials knew the Arabic language and informed the sub-district manager and promised them that if they surrendered, they would all be released.
On the night of Thursday, July 12, 1962, the besieged surrendered, numbering 150 police. The sub-district manager and several police were sent to the revolution's headquarters in Betwata and were imprisoned in a cave. The others were handed back to the Iraqi state via Piranshahr in the country of Iran to Qasr-e Shirin. Barzani's intention in this was for the voice of the revolution to reach the other side of the border. It is clear that when the prisoners reached Iranian soil, the radio and newspapers of Europe had published the news. Regarding the prisoners of Betwata, one of whom was Sergeant Karim Khorani, the officer in charge of the Rayat Castle police, he was executed after being imprisoned. The sub-district manager asked to see Ali Askari one day and told him that you did not keep your promise, and he, too, was released after a few days along with several police.
Although on July 5, 1962, a delegation from the Second Division of the Iraqi Army arrived to meet Masoud Barzani in Haji Omaran for the purpose of negotiation and agreement, it had no results. After the seizure of the fortress, the gains of the revolution consisted of 103 Russian, English, and Polish weapons, 6 Russian Bren machine guns, 3000 English bullets, a radio device, and a charging device. Also, by the decision of the revolution, the Rayat fortress was turned into a prison, and the responsibility for it was given to Saeed Masifi.
On July 11, 1962, at the time of the surrender of those besieged, an urgent letter from Omar Dababa reached Masoud Barzani, in which he had indicated that a fierce battle was continuing between the forces under his command and a group of mercenaries (Jash), and he requested urgent help from Masoud Barzani to hold some positions that the gunmen had managed to seize. Masoud Barzani himself, along with a group of Peshmerga, went to help them. When Masoud Barzani and his force reached the scene of the battle, the mercenary gunmen lost their morale and could not continue and were defeated. The battle ended in favor of the Peshmerga. They left all the places they had seized and crossed into Iranian territory. In this battle, two Peshmerga were Martyred and 12 were wounded.
In this way, the Rayat police station and the only force of the Iraqi government in the area were destroyed and removed from the area with local techniques and without losses. Until the end of the revolution, the state forces could not return to the area. Also, the revolution imposed full authority over the area and took steps toward a new phase in terms of establishing the revolutionary spirit, dispelling the regime's fear over the citizens of the area, and increasing the number of Peshmerga.
Sources:1- Masoud Barzani, Barzani and the Kurdish Liberation Movement, Volume Three, Part One, September Revolution 1961-1975, First Edition 2004.
2- Ismail Gondezhori, September Revolution in Balakayati, Rojhalat Printing House, First Edition, 2018.
3- Shawkat Mullah Ismail Hassan, Days in the History of the September Revolution, First Edition, Erbil, 2007.
4- Hawkar Karim Hama Sharif, September Revolution 1961-1970, First Edition - Salahaddin University Printing House, Erbil, 2012.
5- Ghazi Adil Gardi, A Peshmerga in the Service of the Barzani Path, Haji Birokhi, Volume One, Second Edition, Turkey, 2021.
6- Khurshid Shira, Struggle and Blood, Memoirs of the Years of Peshmerga Struggle, Third Edition, Erbil, 2015.
7- Ari Karim, Several Living Pages in the September Revolution, Khabat Printing House, Duhok 1999.